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M. ScoTr DONAHEY
The year 1996 had several significant developments in the field of international dispute
resolution. These developments occurred in three general areas: (1) international organizations
and arbitration centers; (2) national legislation dealing with international arbitration; and
(3) national court decisions dealing with international arbitration. In the first area, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) circulated the latest text of
the "UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings" (UNCITRAL Notes), the Lon-
don Court of International Arbitration circulated a discussion draft revision of the London
Court of International Arbitration Rules (LCIA Rules), and a new regional center for hemispheric
arbitration was established, the Commercial Arbitration Center for the Americas, adopting
rules for arbitration and for mediation. Second, two major trading countries, England and
India, adopted new arbitration statutes, and a third, Japan, passed a law permitting non-Japanese
lawyers to represent clients in international arbitrations taking place in Japan. Finally, significant
national cases dealt with an arbitrator's duty to disdose potential conflicts, with the court's
discretion, to support arbitration after an unnecessary delay in proceeding, and with the existence
of a valid arbitration clause. In addition, I have selected one case which deals with the enforceabil-
ity of a double damages statute in a rather curious manner.
I. International Institutions and Centers
The UNCITRAL Notes project dates back to 1993 and is meant to be a source of ideas
and resources for international arbitrators. It is not intended to impose a regime, to add require-
ments that are in addition to those found in existing laws, rules, and practices, nor to harmonize
or summarize existing law. The current text of the UNCITRAL Notes covers nineteen general
areas of arbitration practice. The text lists areas in which an international arbitrator may be
expected to act in the organization of arbitral proceedings and suggests possible approaches.
Once the UNCITRAL Notes have received final approval from the Commission, the Secretariat
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will edit the final version to ensure conformance with the various official languages and with
other UNCITRAL texts, particularly as regards the use of technical terms. Following this editing
process, the text will be published and widely disseminated to arbitral organizations, centers,
and professional associations.'
Two centers, one of them venerable and one of them new, have proposed new sets of
international rules. The London Court of International Arbitration, perhaps the oldest interna-
tional arbitration center, has circulated a Discussion Draft of proposed revisions to the LCIA
Rules. Some of the most significant features of the proposed revisions include: (1) A new article
which provides for the application for interim relief in the form of a provisional order. These
orders have contractual weight only, and are not enforceable as awards. The parties' rights to
seek interim relief from a court are not to be deemed abridged by the inclusion of this article;
(2) A provision which permits a truncated tribunal, that is to say, two arbitrators of a three-person
panel where the third arbitrator has failed or refused to participate in the proceedings, to
conduct the arbitration and issue an award. The commentary on this article indicates that it
is a very controversial provision within the LCIA; and (3) Two articles have been modified
to allow the LCIA Court of Arbirtration to have the final word on the fixing of arbitrators'
fees. It was felt that the freedom given to arbitrators in this regard under the present rules
sometimes has resulted in exorbitant fees.2
The other institution which has adopted new sets of rules is one which came into existence
in 1996: The Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Center for the Americas, jointly adminis-
tered by the American Arbitration Association, the British Columbia International Commercial
Arbitration Centre, The Mexico City National Chamber of Commerce, and the Quebec Na-
tional and International Commercial Arbitration Centre. The CAMCA Arbitration Rules are
closely modeled on the International Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.
CAMCA has also adopted a set of Mediation Rules, one which follows very closely the
Mediation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The founding of CAMCA was based
in part on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provision which encourages the
use of alternative dispute resolution. CAMCA is governed by a twelve-person council composed
of representatives from the three NAFTA countries, and chaired by an appointee from one
of the four member institutions on a rotating basis.
II. National Legislation
In addition to the activities of international bodies, national legislatures have enacted significant
laws concerning the conduct of international arbitration. In England and Wales, the United
Kingdom Parliament has enacted the English Arbitration Act 1996, which act is to become
operative once the new rules of the Supreme Court of England and Wales are in place, which
is expected to be on or after January 1, 1997. The Act contains several significant additions
to English arbitration law, which undoubtedly will find their way into the laws of present and
former commonwealth countries. The Act contains an express requirement that arbitrators
must act fairly and impartially, avoiding unnecessary delay and expense. While these concepts
have been present in case law, they have not previously been expressly set out in statute. The
Act applies whenever the seat of the arbitration is in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
While continuing to require that the arbitration agreement be set out in writing, the definition
1. Vol. I, No. 2 LCIA WORLDWiDE AM. NEWSL. (Oct. 1996) at 9.
2. Id. at 10-19.
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of writing has been expanded to include unsigned writings, oral agreements memorialized in
writing by a party or the arbitrator, or alleged in writing by one party in a written submission
which is not denied by the other party. The arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide all
procedural and evidentiary matters, subject only to the agreement of the parties. An arbitral
award is subject to challenge on the basis of jurisdiction, "serious irregularity," and to appeal
on a point of law. Only the last is not mandatory, and appeal on a point of law may be excluded
in an international arbitration by agreement of the parties.
India enacted new arbitration and conciliation laws closely modeled on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules.
In addition to setting out the provisions of the above referenced rules, the Indian Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 sets out provisions for enforcement of foreign awards under the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of
1958 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927. One
of the most significant changes in the new arbitration act is the deletion of a provision which
had been interpreted by Indian courts as precluding enforcement of an arbitration award as a
foreign award where the underlying agreement was governed by the law of India. It is now
expected that any award rendered outside India and brought to India for enforcement will
henceforth be enforceable as a foreign award.3
Finally, Japan has passed a law which ends the previous prohibition on the representation
by non-Japanese lawyers of parties in international arbitrations in Japan.4 The law defines an
international arbitration case as one in which the place of arbitration is Japan and in which
at least one of the parties has its principal office in a country other than Japan. In such a case,
a party may be represented by a foreign lawyer registered to practice in Japan or by a foreign
lawyer retained for international arbitration cases in the countries in which they practice. This
is true even if the matters to be arbitrated are governed by Japanese substantive law.5
III. Court Decisions
In two recent decisions, one American and one English, courts have refused to enforce
arbitration because of prolonged, inexcusable delay. In the American case,6 the court was asked
to compel arbitration of a dispute which had arisen more than twenty years earlier. A dispute
arose in 1974, and the claimant then filed a claim in arbitration. In 1975, the respondent filed
its own demand for arbitration. Both parties then appointed arbitrators, who in turn appointed
a chair. In 1986, the chair died. Seven years later the two arbitrators appointed a new chair,
who resigned the following year, as did respondent's arbitrator. The claimant then filed a
petition to compel arbitration in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. The court found that Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act implicitly authorized the
court to adjudicate any procedural issues, including those of timeliness of the claim. In this
regard, the court distinguished the situation before the court which involved a petition to
compel arbitration, which went to the making and performance of the arbitration agreement
from the timeliness of a demand for arbitration, which goes to the underlying claim and is
3. Id. at 7-8.
4. 1 Law No. 65 of 1996, 12 June 1996.
5. LCIA WORLDWIDE ARE. NEWSL., Supra, note 1, at 8.
6. Astro Vencedor Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Gen. Org. for Supply Goods, Cairo, 94-3429, 1996 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 602 (S.D.N.Y.) (Jan. 23, 1996).
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thus a matter that an arbitrator, rather than a court, should decide. The court noted that
nothing in the record could serve to explain the lengthy periods of inactivity. The court rejected
the claimant's argument that the respondent failed to reject arbitration until 1994, stating that
an express, unequivocal refusal was unnecessary because of the extended period of inactivity.
The court also held that the petition to compel arbitration was untimely under the New York
statute of limitations for bringing an action based on contract. While not setting out a bright
line test, the court noted that the decision was based on the eighteen-year unexplained period
of inactivity and the prejudice to the respondent inherent in the delay. The court declined to
rule on respondent's claim that the inactivity amounted to a waiver of the right to arbitrate,
since such a claim is properly addressed to the arbitrator, rather than to the court.
In a similar fashion, the English Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court decision that
the English Arbitration Act gave the court the discretion to refuse to aid an arbitration
where there has been "inordinate and inexcusable delay." 7 A dispute arose regarding a
settlement which had been reached in 1979. Four years later a claim was made, which was
rejected, and negotiations ensued over a period of eighteen months. The parties then entered
into a written agreement to arbitrate. For seven years thereafter the parties debated the
proper form which the arbitration should take. In September 1991, these discussions broke
down. Claimant then notified respondent that arbitration had been validly commenced in
1984. In October 1994, the claimant served respondent with a summons seeking court
appointment of an arbitrator. The lower court held that there was a binding agreement to
arbitrate, but refused to appoint an arbitrator, citing the claimant's delay. The Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court, holding that Section 10 of the Arbitration Act vested the
court with unfettered discretion in refusing to appoint an arbitrator. The court noted that
it was unnecessary to establish prejudice to the respondent, so long as there has been
"inordinate and inexcusable delay." The Court of Appeal went on to hold that there had
been no binding agreement to arbitrate in any event, since there had been no agreement
on matters of substance, noting that substantial procedural agreement would be necessary
to supersede the written provisions of the standard form agreement.
A U.S. court also refused to compel arbitration on the basis that no binding agreement to
arbitrate existed.' In this case the parties had negotiated the terms of an agreement over a
period of a month, by exchange of telexes and faxes containing offers and counteroffers. There
was no final signed agreement. When a dispute arose, the daimant argued that the respondent
had agreed to arbitration in New York. When the respondent refused to appoint an arbitrator,
the claimant brought a petition to compel arbitration in federal district court in New York.
The court found that a valid contract existed and then looked to customs and practices in the
trade to see whether that agreement embodied an agreement to arbitration in New York.
Finding that the agreement lacked notice of agreement to a particular type of arbitration, the
court rejected the claimant's argument that the phrase "otherwise as per owners charter party"
too indefinite to be an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. The court distinguished other cases
in which a specific charter party form or arbitration clause had been identified. The court
noted that the revised charter party agreement was not sent to the respondent until some weeks
after the vessel had sailed from the loading port.
7. Frota Oceanica Brasiliera SA v. Steamship Underwriting Assoc. Ltd., App. Uuly 30, 1996).
8. Samsun Corporation v. Khozestan Mashine Kar Co., 95-3523, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7531 (S.D.N.Y.)
(May 30, 1995).
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Two recent decisions in U.S. courts wrestled with the problem of an arbitrator's duty to
disclose. In both cases the court found no obligation on the part of an arbitrator to discover
and disclose certain facts. The first case arose in a dispute arbitrated in Guam. Following the
issuance of an award, the losing party challenged the award on the basis that the arbitrator
and an expert witness for the prevailing party were both limited partners in an apartment
complex in Hawaii.! The arbitrator had failed to disclose this relationship. Both the arbitrator
and the expert filed declarations stating that neither knew that the other was a limited partner
in the investment. The trial court found that the facts created an "impression of possible bias"
and vacated the award. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the arbitrator
and expert witness were passive investors in a limited partnership that was unrelated to the
arbitration, that neither knew of the relationship, and that there was nothing that either could
do to curry favor with the other. The court of appeals also noted that several members of the
losing party's law firm were also partners in the same limited partnership.
In the second case, the losing party moved to vacate the award on the basis that the arbitrator
had failed to disclose that his former law firm had represented the prevailing party in unrelated
matters.' The court rejected the position taken by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal that
the arbitrator's duty to disclose incorporates a duty to investigate. " The court of appeal noted
that it was undisputed that the arbitrator had no knowledge of the representation. The court
expressly held that the arbitrator had no duty to conduct an investigation of prior affiliations.
The court distinguished the Scbmitz case as one involving the National Association of Securities
Dealers Code which imposes a duty to investigate on the arbitrator.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld a lower court decision that the award of
double damages pursuant to a state statute was within the arbitrator's authority.' 2 The German
party had acted as a sales agent for a Michigan manufacturer. When a dispute arose, the sales
agent brought suit in federal district court, and the manufacturer moved to compel arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration provision in the contract at issue, which contract was governed by
Michigan law. An arbitration was held in London at which the sales agent was awarded damages
which included an award of double damages made pursuant to a Michigan statute which
provided for doubling the amount of commissions owed if the failure to pay were found to
be intentional. The manufacturer challenged the inclusion of statutory damages in the award.
The district court denied the challenge and confirmed the award, and the manufacturer appealed.
The court of appeal rejected the manufacturer's contention that the award should not be
enforced as to the doubling of damages as the statute was punitive in nature. Rather, the
appellate court supported the arbitrator's reasoning that the damages were compensatory in
nature, which the court noted was supported by the legislative history. Moreover, the court
noted that the arbitrator had been given very broad powers to make any appropriate award,
and thus the damage award was within that power.
9. Apusento Garden (Guam) Inc. v. Superior Court of Guam, 94 F.3d 1346, 1996 WL 502104 (9th Cir.
Guam).
10. AI-Haribi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
II. Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
12. M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GMBH & Co., 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 1996).
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